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COGNITIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE RELEVANCE OF ON-LINE 
CONSTRUCTIONS1 
Stavros Assimakopoulos, 
University of Edinburgh 
stavros@ling.ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 
In this paper, focusing on the relevance-theoretic view of cognition, I discuss the idea that what 
is communicated through an utterance is not merely an explicature upon which implicature(s) are 
recovered, but rather a propositional complex that contains both explicit and implicit information. 
More specifically, I propose that this information is constructed on the fly as the interpreter 
processes every lexical item in its turn while parsing the utterance in real time, in this way creating 
a string of ad hoc concepts. While hearing an utterance and incrementally constructing a context, 
the propositional complex communicated by an utterance is pragmatically narrowed and 
simultaneously pragmatically broadened in order to incorporate only the set of optimally relevant 
propositions with respect to a specific point in the interpretation. The narrowing of propositions 
from the initial context at each stage allows relevant propositions to be carried on to the new level, 
while their broadening adds to the communicated propositional complex new propositions that are 
linked to the lexical item that is processed at every step of the interpretation process. 
1 Introduction  
In the tradition of linguistics, most investigations tend to equate an utterance’s basic 
proposition with its semantic representation. This perspective although theoretically 
attractive, can prove to be problematic with respect to its psychological plausibility (Recanati 
2004). At the same time, current research in pragmatics can help offer a more realistic 
alternative that would allow contextual intrusions to influence the basic proposition 
communicated by an utterance. A suitable pragmatic framework that could provide a rich 
background in which to investigate propositional content without compromising the account’s 
psychological plausibility is Relevance Theory, which has already developed a realistic 
approach to cognition. 
This paper sets out to examine propositional content as this is constructed during utterance 
interpretation and in accordance with the relevance-driven comprehension procedure. To 
begin with, I will present the basic assumptions of the relevance-theoretic framework and, 
then, move on to a relevance-theoretic description of the aspects of cognition that underline 
the context-dependent nature of knowledge representations in our cognitive environment 
when it comes to verbal communication. In this way, I will introduce the basic ideas that 
motivate the account proposed by this paper. After discussing the relevance-theoretic notion 
of context, I will present a scenario of how propositional content is derived directly from the 
cognitive and communicative approach proposed in Relevance itself. In conclusion, I will 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Ronnie Cann, Robyn Carston, Caroline Heycock, Ruth Kempson and Deirdre Wilson whose 
invaluable suggestions and extensive comments fine-tuned the contents of this paper and helped me clarify 
important details of the current account; yet, they are not to be taken responsible for any errors or 
misinterpretations present here. Many thanks also to the audience, and particularly Jim Hurford and Dan 
Wedgwood, who commented on a first version of this paper presented at the University of Edinburgh. Finally, I 
would like to thank the Sinn und Bedeutung 10 organizers and audience as well as the editors of the present 
volume.   
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discuss the implications the proposed account carries and suggest directions for future 
investigations   
1.1 Relevance Theory 
As a framework, Relevance Theory was received with great enthusiasm by researchers across 
a wide range of fields, since it provided a revolutionizing approach to cognitive pragmatics, 
by redefining it in terms of characterizations of relevance. In the mid 80s, Sperber and Wilson 
developed a framework that addresses communication as a process that involves inference in 
the recovery of meaning to as great a degree as encoding and decoding. 
The motivation behind Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1987, 1995, Wilson and 
Sperber 2004) lies in the ground-breaking work of Grice in the field of pragmatics (1957, 
1975, 1989). Sperber and Wilson took up Grice’s central idea that communication involves 
not only a single level of coding and decoding – in the Saussurean meaning of semiology 
(1974), but also an inferential level that is essential in providing the hearer with the speaker’s 
meaning. Grice had laid down a model of utterance comprehension that described the social 
norms that apply to communication in the shape of a Cooperative Principle and a set of 
maxims that people attend to when engaging in it: two maxims of truthfulness, two of 
informativeness, one of relevance and four of clarity.  
Relevance Theory, even though highly influenced by Grice’s pioneering work, redefines 
communication as a cognitive exercise. Sperber and Wilson hold that when we engage in 
communication we do not merely follow social norms that tell us how to communicate, but 
rather follow a specific cognitive path that makes us communicate efficiently. This path is 
prescribed solely on the grounds of our expectations of relevance which are “precise and 
predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the speaker’s meaning” (Wilson and Sperber 
2004:607). 
Now, what makes an utterance or a general input to our cognitive environment relevant 
depends on a balance of cognitive effects and processing effort. Other things being equal, the 
more this stimulus changes our cognitive environment in a positive way the more relevant it 
is, and the less processing effort it demands in doing so the more relevant it is. Sperber and 
Wilson support the idea that relevance considerations play a central role in the way our whole 
cognitive system works. This is spelled out in the Cognitive Principle of Relevance they put 
forward:  
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance. 
In the same spirit, they also address communication and, especially, a particular form of it, 
ostensive-inferential communication. As opposed to other forms of communication, 
ostensive-inferential communication involves two layers of intentionality from the 
communicator’s point of view. In engaging in this sort of communication, she does not only 
intend to make manifest to her audience some information (informative intention), but she 
also intends to make it mutually manifest to both her and her audience that she has this 
informative intention (communicative intention). In other words, the cognitive task of 
pursuing ostensive communication means that the communicator does not only communicate 
a set of assumptions, but also her intention to share this information with her audience.  
Against this background, Sperber and Wilson propose a second principle of relevance, the 
Communicative one, which links ostensive communication to expectations of relevance:  
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance. 
According to this principle, the audience of ostensive-inferential communication always has a 
right to presume the optimal relevance of the input given to it. This means that it always has a 
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right to presume that the stimulus provided is relevant enough to be worth its processing 
effort, in the sense that it should provide large positive cognitive effects with minimal effort 
expenditure, and it is the most relevant one compatible with its communicator’s abilities and 
preferences. On the grounds of the definition of relevance and optimal relevance, relevance 
theorists also suggest that the comprehension procedure follows a prescribed path:  
Check interpretive hypotheses in order of their accessibility, that is, follow a path of 
least effort, until an interpretation which satisfies the expectation of relevance (i.e. 
yields enough cognitive effects etc.) is found; then stop. 
Coming back to Grice with a view to addressing utterance interpretation, another pioneering 
assumption of his that is important to relevance-theorists is his notion of implicatures. In 
Grice’s work, the explicit meaning of an utterance is basically decoded via a code (i.e. the 
language system) while what an utterance implies is derived inferentially from the exact 
decoded content (i.e. literally what is said), after this has been retrieved, in the form of 
implicatures. In Relevance Theory, decoded and inferred information are not distinguished in 
this absolute way, since inferential pragmatic enrichment takes place also in the recovery of 
an utterance’s explicit content, that is its explicature(s), like in the case of reference 
resolution. In instances of verbal communication, the interpreter of an utterance relies on 
inference to complete all three subtasks that will guide him to recognizing the intended 
meaning of the speaker’s utterance. As Wilson and Sperber suggest, these subtasks involve 
three levels of construction (2004:615): 
a. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (explicatures) via 
decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment 
processes.  
b. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions 
(implicated premises). 
c. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications 
(implicated conclusions).  
All these subtasks involve inferential processing to a great extent, while an important feature 
of them is that they are not “sequentially ordered: the hearer does not FIRST decode the 
logical form, THEN construct an explicature and select an appropriate context, and THEN 
derive a range of implicated conclusions” (ibid.). 
This brief introduction to Relevance Theory is by no means exhaustive. Its applications are 
numerous and further ideas it puts forward will be discussed in the parts to come. What needs 
to be addressed at this point is what the relevance-theoretic framework has to say about the 
way mental content is organized and accessed during utterance interpretation. 
2 On the human cognitive system  
This part of the paper addresses the way in which Relevance Theory assumes knowledge is 
represented in the human cognitive system. In their framework, Sperber and Wilson have 
sustained a modified Fodorian view of a modular mind (Fodor 1983)2 along with his view that 
our cognitive environment consists of propositions (Fodor 1975); yet, they have, on several 
                                                 
2 Even though this is of little interest for the purposes of this paper, Sperber and Wilson have since 2000 
departed quite substantially from Fodor’s view of central processes opting for a more modular approach to what 
Fodor would traditionally treat as central processes (Sperber and Wilson 2002, Wilson 2005). On other 
occasions, Sperber (1994, 2002) has suggested a model of massive modularity that views the mind as modular 
through and through with modules coming in all sizes and formats, even in the size of a concept. 
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occasions, criticised Fodor’s views on specific cognitive issues, namely his interpretation of 
the frame problem3, something I will come back to later on.   
According to Sperber and Wilson, the total of the knowledge represented in our minds 
partially constitutes our cognitive environment. More specifically, they define an individual’s 
cognitive environment as “the set of all the facts that he can perceive or infer: all the facts that 
are manifest to him” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:39), in the shape of assumptions that might be 
either true or false. More specifically, they suggest that “an individual’s total cognitive 
environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. It consists 
not only of the facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming 
aware of, in his physical environment”. (ibid.) 
In this way, Sperber and Wilson manage to capture the idea that our system of thoughts, i.e. 
mental representations, contains not only the new information we acquire through the 
processing of a stimulus – might that be anything from a perceivable object in our visual or 
acoustic environment to an utterance that we are called to interpret, but also the information 
that we can acquire through the additional processing of a processed stimulus. These extra 
representations that are derived from originally perceived ones are as important as the latter in 
mental processing and can potentially be stored in our knowledge database in very much the 
same way as perceptually-acquired information is4. This view of a cognitive environment 
respects individuality and gives a psychologically indispensable level of subjectivity to the set 
of assumptions and thoughts that are represented in our mind5.  
As already mentioned before, Relevance Theory sustains the Fodorian view that our cognitive 
environment consists of a propositional repertoire. Thoughts, i.e. “conceptual 
representations”, and assumptions, i.e. subjective “thoughts treated by the individual as 
representations of the actual world” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:2) are logical forms that have 
an internal structure, in the form of systematically combined conceptual meanings.  
2.1 Concepts 
Right from its emergence, Relevance Theory has taken up a point that is generally 
undisputable within cognitive science. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:85), “it seems 
reasonable to regard logical forms, and in particular the propositional forms of assumptions, 
as composed of smaller constituents to whose presence and structural arrangements the 
deductive rules are sensitive. These constituents we will call concepts”.  
Sperber and Wilson treat concepts as “triples of entries, logical, lexical and encyclopaedic, 
filed at an address” (1995:92). A concept has a logical entry in the sense of a set of formal 
deductive rules that apply to logical forms containing the concept at hand and that produce 
conclusions from a set of premises. The lexical entry of a concept contains “information about 
the natural-language lexical item used to represent it” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:90). This 
information is both phonological and grammatical. Finally, the encyclopaedic entry of a 
                                                 
3 Sperber and Wilson (1996) address the Fodorian Frame Problem as wrongly formulated to begin with by 
claiming that rational central processes would not consider all information provided as modular input, but rather 
a selected relevant set of them.  
4 A very good example of information that is provided on such grounds is metarepresentational information, 
information that maps representations over representations in the way discussed by Sperber (2000) and Wilson 
(2000). 
5 Subjectivity in mental representations is deemed indispensable in a psychologically realistic account of 
cognition because different individuals might store in their minds different assumptions for the same stimuli. As 
Penco argues (1999) cognitive science seems to favour “the subjective, cognitive representation of the world” 
(after McCarthy 1993) over “an objective, metaphysical state of affair” (after Kaplan 1989). 
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concept is the set of extra information that is linked to its denotation. So, for example, if you 
have the concept APPLE under scrutiny you can schematically represent its entries as 
follows6: 
Logical entry: inference rules (e.g. X – APPLE – Y ==>  
              X – FRUIT OF A CERTAIN KIND – Y) 
 
APPLE  Lexical entry: phonological and syntactic information for the lexical item ‘apple’ 
 
Encyclopaedic entry: encyclopaedic information about apples (e.g. red colour, green colour, 
found on trees, in grocery stores, black seed, low in fat, healthy food, etc.) 
 
Against this background, most concepts can be represented through their triple entries. Of 
course, “occasionally, an entry for a particular concept may be empty or lacking” (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995:92). For example, a concept like BUT would not have an encyclopaedic 
entry, since it has no extension. Similarly, proper names may lack logical entries. Many 
concepts even lack lexical entries, like the concept that has UNCLE and AUNT as its 
subcategories and contains information that is common to both concepts (after Sperber and 
Wilson 1998).  
Relevance Theory distinguishes between the concepts that are stored in our cognitive system 
and the ones that are communicated through an act of ostensive communication. The former 
are stable, containing all information linked to the concept in a single conceptual space. 
However, the concepts that are communicated as parts of, say, the propositional form of an 
utterance, are rather ad hoc concepts that are constructed on-line during the interpretation 
process.  
The notion of ad hoc conceptual entities was first introduced by Barsalou (1987, 1992) in the 
domain of cognitive science. In his paper ‘On the instability of graded structure’ (1987), he 
suggests that individuals tend to produce different sorts of typicality rankings among the same 
conceptual category members when these are processed in context. Individuals will give 
different rankings of the same concepts when asked to do so in different situations, like in the 
case of their own point of view or when judging from the point of view of others. In the same 
way, people can construct typicality rankings for ad hoc categories (e.g. THINGS THAT 
CAN FALL ON YOUR HEAD). Through his examples, Barsalou shows that people can 
easily produce varying representations of the world reflecting context-dependent information 
they might even have never been processed beforehand in a fast and creative way (Barsalou 
1983, 1987, 1993). 
Following the experimental research of Barsalou, relevance-theorists suggested that the 
content of a concept as communicated within a context is constructed ad hoc out of the 
combination of different parts of encyclopaedic information we have stored in our cognitive 
system. In other words, relevance-theorists have employed Barsalou’s terminology and 
experiments7 to describe the end-product of a process of on-line concept construction during 
the interpretation process (Carston 2002, 2004, Wilson 2004, Wilson and Sperber 2004). The 
relevance-theoretic account of lexical meaning suggests that a lexical form maps to a 
conceptual address in memory, the address that links to the lexical, logical and encyclopaedic 
entries of a concept, and the context provides the relevant encyclopaedic information that is 
used with the communicated ad hoc concept in a selective manner. For example, let us 
consider the following utterance: 
                                                 
6 After Wilson 2002 
7 Barsalou’s work has provided evidence mainly for the relevance-theoretic claims of conceptual narrowing that 
have been present since the beginning of the framework. Later, these claims were generalised to apply to 
broadening as well (Carston 1996). 
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(1) Mary wants to meet some bachelors. 
The standard relevance-theoretic account would suggest that what is communicated in this 
utterance is a set of concepts, including an ad hoc concept BACHELOR*. This move is 
justifiable by certain assumptions communicated along with the utterance in the context of 
situation. From the point of view of Mary and our knowledge about her the ad hoc concept 
BACHELOR* refers to unmarried men who are eligible for marriage. In this way, the Pope 
would not qualify as a bachelor that Mary wants to meet. Similarly, in the situation where 
Mary is thinking about becoming a nun and is, thus, considering ‘unweddedness’, she might 
want to meet bachelors that have also selected to remain unwedded, by becoming God’s 
servants of some sort, and are, therefore, not eligible to marriage.   
Relevance Theory makes a clear distinction between already stored concepts that are holistic 
and contain specific information within interconnected conceptual spaces and concepts that 
are constructed on-line. What relevance theorists are now dealing with in their work in lexical 
pragmatics is the way in which these two ‘types’ of concepts are linked (Wilson 2004). In a 
nutshell, Relevance Theory suggests that ‘the stored lexical concept provides the starting 
point for the on-line construction of the ad hoc concept which proceeds as part of the 
utterance comprehension process and so is constrained, as ever, by the search for an optimally 
relevant interpretation’. 
The view that I will be employing in this paper is that all communicated concepts are in effect 
ad hoc concepts. This move should be justified within the general picture of the relevance-
theoretic framework. The linguistically encoded stored concept that is triggered by the 
utterance of a lexical item points to some space in memory within which the interpreter needs 
to look for relevant information against the context in which he is processing the utterance. 
The relevance heuristic should lead him to select the most easily accessible part of this 
information that will provide adequate cognitive effects. In this way, the information 
communicated by each lexical item in an utterance does not correspond to the whole of the 
stored concept’s information but is constructed ad hoc by the interpreter in the manner 
prescribed by the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure.  
2.2 Propositions 
Having addressed conceptual content, a discussion of propositional content seems 
indispensable at this point. As already noted above, against the background of Relevance 
Theory, propositions are logical forms that constitute structured sets of concepts. In light of 
the previous treatment of concepts, it is clear that when it comes to utterance interpretation, 
propositional content comprises structured ad hoc concepts8. 
An important aspect of utterance interpretation that was underlined by Sperber and Wilson in 
Relevance is that the recovery of explicatures and implicatures occur on the fly. As put forth 
in the identification of the subtasks involved in the utterance comprehension process, 
interpretation takes place in a time-linear manner. This should have direct implications for the 
examination of an utterance’s communicated propositional content.  
Firstly, the proposition communicated by an utterance is constructed on-line by the hearer. 
This challenges the traditional view that equates the basic proposition communicated by an 
utterance with its semantic representation. Taking up the relevance-theoretic account of 
                                                 
8 A point that needs to be put forth here is that there is a distinction between what a proposition is with respect to 
cognition and what a proposition is with respect to communication. The latter, which is in the centre of attention 
in this paper, is an outcome of the interpretation process that is constructed on-line, while the former is stored in 
our cognitive system and has a relatively stable content. 
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meaning construction makes this basic semantic representation of a given utterance a mere 
template upon which pragmatic enrichment takes place. In a psychologically plausible 
account of utterance interpretation, the hearer parses and interprets an utterance in a left-to-
right time linear way. While the hearer processes the utterance one step at a time, lexical item 
by lexical item, he is enriching the semantic content of each communicated concept against a 
context. This occurs dynamically and the hearer would not necessarily wait up to the end of 
the utterance to engage in any processing. Sperber and Wilson assume that “logical forms, 
like syntactic forms are trees of labeled nodes” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:205). By parallel 
arguments to the ones that want syntactic labels to generalize over grammatical categories, 
logical labels categorise conceptual representations of different types. As Sperber and Wilson 
argue (1995:206), by association to syntactic anticipatory hypotheses the hearer may make, he 
can easily make anticipatory hypotheses for the logical categories that are to appear before 
they do9. Consequently, at any point during interpretation the hearer both entertains specific 
expectations about what is to follow and can amend his previous choices in constructing the 
propositional content of an utterance. 
Accordingly, in utterance interpretation, explicatures and implicatures are constructed on the 
fly as well. Inferential processing occurring to this effect takes place at the same time as the 
decoding of the utterance’s content. What is suggested again by this view is that what an 
utterance communicates is constructed dynamically. Essentially, what a hearer constructs 
successively in interpreting an utterance is not a basic proposition upon which further 
conclusions (in the shape of higher-order explicatures or implicatures) are inferred, but rather 
a propositional complex that contains both explicit and implicit propositions.  
In this sense, an utterance’s basic proposition is redefined to its pragmatically enriched 
semantic content. This would ultimately mean that what the hearer has at the end of an 
utterance’s interpretation is a structured set of ad hoc concepts, i.e. an ad hoc basic 
proposition, which communicates a certain set of additional propositions (thoughts) about the 
explicit and implicit information conveyed by the utterance.  
3 Communicated propositional content  
Having established the aspects that a psychologically plausible account of communicated 
propositional content needs to respect, a rather straightforward picture of the way in which 
propositional content is constructed in utterance interpretation presents itself. A final point 
that needs to be noted is that the construction of an utterance’s propositional content always 
occurs against a context. So, before moving on to the account of how an utterance’s enriched 
basic proposition is constructed, it is important to introduce the notion of context in 
Relevance Theory. 
3.1 Context in Relevance Theory 
In Relevance, Sperber and Wilson provide an insightful definition of context that respects its 
subjective nature and is general enough to accommodate the variety of information context 
contains in every situation (1995:15-16): 
                                                 
9 Relevance Theory has little to say about this, but a formal account that incorporates relevance-theoretic 
assumptions in its theoretical premises, Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et.al. 2001), makes extensive use of this 
idea. Dynamic Syntax holds that when a hearer interprets an utterance, parsing it one lexical item at a time, he 
entertains specific expectations about what is to follow in the utterance. This is clearly illustrated in cases of 
routinisation (Purver et.al. to appear):  
(e.g.) Ruth: What did Alex give to 
Hugh: Eliot? A teddy-bear. 
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A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the 
world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world, that 
affect the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to 
information about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding 
utterances: expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, 
anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the 
speaker, may all play a role in interpretation.  
It is clear from this description that, in the relevance-theoretic framework, context is not a 
metaphysical concept, since it does not contain information about ‘the actual state of the 
world’, but rather information about an individual’s representation of the world in the sense of 
a ‘private logbook’ or ‘an ego-centred map’. In Relevance, Sperber and Wilson discuss 
context to a considerable extent (1995:132-142). In their discussion, they discard the classical 
view that in the interpretation of the utterance the context is given and predetermined. In a 
luminous discussion of what this case would entail, they reach the conclusion that such a view 
of context would ultimately require the whole volume of our cognitive environment to be the 
context of the interpretation of a single utterance. Resolving this impossibility they suggest 
that “the context used to process new assumptions is, essentially, a subset of the individual’s 
old assumptions, with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual 
effects” (1995:132). And this subset is selected on-line while the interpretation takes place. 
However, even though they have been criticised for not doing so (Chiappe an Kukla 1996), 
Sperber and Wilson never explicitly discussed the way in which we selectively construct a 
context when interpreting an utterance. 
Against this background, in previous work on context selection (Assimakopoulos 2003), I 
have entertained the idea that an utterance’s context is selected automatically by the same 
heuristic that mediates the construction of its explicature(s) and implicatures, the relevance-
driven comprehension procedure. Within the spirit of the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, I 
have proposed that relevance considerations mediate the process of selecting a set of 
assumptions against which an utterance is to be processed and comprehended, a line that will 
be maintained for the purposes of this paper too.   
3.2 Constructing an utterance’s propositional complex 
At this point and in the dynamics discussed in the previous parts, it would be interesting to see 
how an utterance’s basic proposition in the sense endorsed by this paper is constructed on-line 
as each lexical item10 of the utterance is interpreted in turn.  
At the outset of the interpretation process there is always an initial context present to the 
hearer before the utterance is produced. This is a set of propositions that are not tested for 
cognitive effects with respect to this utterance up to the point when the first lexical item is 
uttered. In a dialogue this context would minimally be the propositional complex expressed 
by the previous utterance.  
With the utterance of the first lexical item a subset of propositions is selected in a relevance-
driven manner from the initial context. Along with this set, more propositions are triggered by 
the new concept that is introduced and added to the context in which the hearer interprets the 
utterance. All these propositions will be again tested for relevance as more lexical items are 
                                                 
10 I will assume that a lexical item is a lexical chunk (either a word, an idiom etc) that carries a homogeneous 
meaning in its premises. “It is clear that we can use and understand far more words (in the morphological sense) 
than we have learned. As soon as one learns the word stay, the words stayed, staying and stays all come for free” 
(Bloom 2000:16). For the purposes of this paper I will take up a rather simplistic notion that connects conceptual 
information with the meaning of a word as a whole. I believe that morphology would have more to say about 
this, but will not attend to it as of now. 
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processed in turn. Again, some of these propositions will be abandoned and new ones will be 
tested for relevance against the context of the utterance up to the point where the utterance 
ends.  
I will try to illuminate what is still a quite blurry picture by use of an example utterance and 
the propositional complex its production makes the hearer to construct:  
(2) John loved the smell of Mary. 
To begin with, there is an initial context Si present before the uttering of the first word. This 
context consists of propositions T11 that are linked to whatever provided cognitive effects 
prior to the hearing of this utterance – that is something in the physical environment or even a 
previous utterance the hearer just processed. 
 
         T   T    T 
       T    T    T   T      
            T  T 
           T 
        Si 
Upon hearing the first word, John, the hearer begins his interpretation. The conceptual 
address for JOHN is, thus, triggered in his mind. The whole set of this concept’s information 
is activated but not yet tested for cognitive effects. The hearer selects the relevant 
propositions from Si that are likely to be included in the final propositional complex (Cn) 
denoting the meaning of this utterance. These propositions are relevant since they should 
provide large cognitive effects with respect to Si. 
 
       T   T    T                         T      T   T               (Set of propositions from Si that are relevant to ‘John’)       T    T    T   T      !         T     T  T   T 
            T  T                               T   T 
            T                                     T    
         Si                        ‘John’  
Accordingly, at the same time, new propositions about JOHN that are not included in Si, 
namely contextual information about John that is readily available in the hearer’s cognitive 
environment and can provide rich cognitive effects, get added to the list of propositions that 
might be intended to get communicated by this utterance(C1). At the same time, the context in 
which the utterance is processed is augmented to include these propositions as well. 
Discarded propositions from Si would be kept in a buffer that would allow their easy re-
activation.  
 
       T   T    T                       T        T  T     T                  C1       T    T    T   T                  T        T  T  T    T       
            T  T                                 T   T           T T 
              T                                   T                                            
        Si                         ‘John’  
On the hearing of the second word another conceptual address is activated and propositions 
linked to its content are constructed. In a manner similar to the way C1 has been selected, a 
new complex of relevant propositions C2 is constructed. Relevant propositions from the 
previous context are carried over to C2, while new ones triggered by LOVE in the now 
accordingly augmented context that are deemed relevant are added up to it. In this way an ad 
hoc concept JOHN* is constructed. This concept is ad hoc because it contains only the 
information about John that is relevant to this utterance’s interpretation and potentially 
                                                 
11 T is used conveniently to represent thoughts, since these are logical trees in light of Sperber and Wilson’s 
suggestion that Dynamic Syntax developed formally.  
10    Stavros Assimakopoulos  
information that will be included in the final propositional complex that will denote the 
utterance’s meaning. 
 
     T   T    T                          T T      T     T T                         C2                             
      T  T     T  T                      T T    T  T      T 
        T      T  T                           T     T  T   T  T 
                                                                    
    C1 (‘John’)                ‘loved’  
 
          JOHN* 
 
The same scenario applies for all words with conceptual content in the utterance up to the 
point where the interpretation of the final lexical item occurs and the utterance’s 
explicature(s) and implicatures are fully constructed.  
 
        T    T T                                              T     T T        T                          C3              T T    T     T T                      C4 
       T T      T                                            T T      T         T                                             T         T     T 
        T  T   T T                                          T T   T  T   T                                              T T       T     T        
                                                                    
C2 (‘JOHN* loved’)                  ‘the smell’                                 ‘of Mary’ 
 
 JOHN** LOVE* 
 
 JOHN***          LOVE**           SMELL* 
 
At the end of processing the whole utterance, the concept MARY will again be adjusted to the 
ad-hoc concept MARY* that communicates the specific property of having a smell that is 
loved by John. The propositional complex C5 ultimately contains the total of the explicature(s) 
and implicatures the hearer has constructed with respect to utterance (2). In effect, the basic 
proposition of the utterance is this complex that is communicated by it, which is 
pragmatically derived.    
3.3 Propositional content adjustment: narrowing and broadening 
It is obvious in this treatment of propositional content that at every stage of its adjustment 
there are two processes that go on; one of narrowing and one of broadening. After discussing 
each one, I will entertain the possibility of symmetrifying both of them, by proposing that 
both processes are processes of narrowing.  
As already discussed above, at the beginning of the interpretation and upon hearing the first 
lexical item of the utterance, the hearer begins his interpretation by selecting from an initial 
context the propositions that are relevant to the concept communicated by the item just 
uttered. This selection is the result of narrowing the initial contextual space in the search for 
relevance. At the same time this selection takes place, another set of propositions appears to 
the foreground of the processing. This is the set of propositions the utterance of the lexical 
item introduces. Again these propositions are tested for cognitive effects in search of 
relevance against the initial context augmenting it. A relevant set of them is again added up to 
the initial propositional complex that comprises candidates for the utterance’s meaning. In 
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this way, the potential propositional complex is broadened to accommodate more propositions 
introduced by the new lexical concept that is communicated.  
In the tradition of Carston on concept narrowing (Carston 1996, 2002), I will too suggest that 
this broadening and narrowing of propositional content illustrates essentially a case of 
pragmatic narrowing. It is obvious that the heuristic that causes contextual adjustment is 
relevance. In a way, even if the propositional space in which cognitive effects are searched is 
large there is always a need to make it as small as possible in order to save effort. So, even 
when the propositional complex is augmented, the relevance heuristic imposes that not an 
exceedingly large number of new propositions will be added up to it, which in a sense 
narrows down the number of potential candidates for inclusion in the complex.  
4 Conclusion 
Any realistic account of communicated meaning is required to take into account the fact that 
interpretation is a dynamic process that enables pragmatic enrichment to occur automatically 
along with linguistic decoding. This paper has put forward a cognitive account of the way 
knowledge is accessed when context-dependent processing of an utterance takes place. The 
dynamic characteristic of this approach is that it rejects the semantic view of propositional 
content. Pragmatic enrichment occurs at most levels of cognitive processing and evidence 
from cases of on-line meaning construction places context-dependency and especially, as 
expected through the first principle of relevance, relevance considerations to the centre of 
cognition. While engaging in utterance comprehension, the hearer interprets each lexical item 
in turn constructing an enriched basic proposition on-line. At the end of an utterance’s 
processing, this basic proposition is a structured set of ad hoc concepts that also contains all 
the information (thoughts, in the shape of explicatures and implicatures) that is deemed 
relevant at that stage against the context of the utterance.   
No matter how speculative the nature of this system might seem at this point, it manages, 
along with all the other tenets of Relevance Theory, to provide the starting point for a 
potential outline of a generative system for pragmatic competence. Contrary to Chomsky’s 
reservations that an attempt to build a theory of pragmatic competence “yields computational 
systems of hopeless scope, compelling us to try to formulate what amount to ‘theories of 
everything’ that cannot possibly be the topic of rational inquiry” (Stemmer 1999:399-400), 
the relevance-theoretic approach to the way contextual constraints mediate cognitive 
computation seems to succeed in capturing the way mental processing occurs providing the 
foundations for a generative system of communicative competence. 
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